Miami’s hope, Nebraska’s reset and more lessons for six former CFB powers
On Sunday, Nebraska athletic director Trev Alberts, the former Cornhuskers All-American linebacker, stepped to the podium and lamented a moment he “hoped would never come.”
Scott Frost was out as Nebraska’s football coach, hours after falling to 16-31 overall and 5-22 in one-score games. The genuine, justified optimism that accompanied Frost’s return to Nebraska in 2017 was long gone, leaving a proud program further away from its championship past and figuring out what’s next.
“We’ll stop talking about championships, stop talking about things we used to do,” Alberts said.
His words resonated around college football on Sunday, but those in South Florida should have paid particular attention.
For nearly 20 years, Nebraska and Miami lived in college football’s penthouse. (Nebraska had a much longer lease.) Beginning with the 1984 Orange Bowl, when the Hurricanes and Cornhuskers played in a game that would decide the national champion, the teams were fixtures in the title chase. From that Orange Bowl to the 2002 Rose Bowl there were five meetings, and only once did Miami or Nebraska come in rated lower than No. 6 in the AP poll. (Nebraska was No. 11 at the 1992 Orange Bowl.)
From 1983 to 2001, Miami and Nebraska combined for eight national titles.
Both programs have backslid. Since 2003, they’ve combined for zero league championships and only five division crowns. They’ve hired different types of coaches, hoping to break through. Four years after Nebraska landed Frost, a seemingly can’t-miss choice to revive the program, Miami made its own splashy coaching hire of a notable alum in Mario Cristobal.
Frost and Cristobal are different coaches, and Nebraska and Miami are vastly different programs. Both will be in the national spotlight this Saturday, with Nebraska hosting Oklahoma (noon ET, Fox) and Miami traveling to the Texas A&M Aggies (9 p.m. ET, ESPN), and there are lessons in Frost’s failures that Miami can apply as The U works its way back toward the top.
The Huskers and Hurricanes aren’t the only former powers to have fallen, though. Here’s a closer look at Nebraska, Miami and four other programs that surged in the 1980s and 1990s — Florida State, Tennessee, Virginia Tech and Colorado. What has held them back? And what can be done to get things on track again?
Nebraska
Glory days: Nebraska won five national titles from 1970 to 1997 under Bob Devaney and Tom Osborne, including three in four seasons in the mid-1990s. From 1970 and 1984, the Cornhuskers recorded six AP top-four finishes, only two finishes outside the top 10 (none outside the top-12) and nine Big Eight championships. They finished outside the AP Top 25 just twice from 1963 and 2001, recording 24 top 10s. From 1993 to 2001, Nebraska finished outside the AP top eight just once (No. 19 in 1998).
What happened next: In late 2003, Nebraska fired coach Frank Solich despite a 9-3 record. The school went to the NFL for Bill Callahan, who went 27-22 (15-17 Big 12) in four seasons. In late 2014, the school fired coach Bo Pelini despite a 9-3 record. Pelini led the Huskers to three 10-win seasons — the program’s high-water mark since 2003 — but lost four games in each of his first six seasons. Nebraska has since tumbled into its worst stretch since the 1940s, culminating with five straight bowl-less seasons, the past four under Frost. Since 2016, Nebraska ranks 105th nationally in win percentage, one spot behind Duke and two behind Florida International.
What held back the program: Alberts is right about Nebraska’s need to stop dwelling on the past and what went into its championship teams. The letting-go process has been especially difficult in Huskers country. Nebraska has an incredibly passionate and devoted fan base and plenty of donor support (as shown by the school’s decision to fire Frost on Sunday, rather than waiting three more weeks for his buyout to drop by $7.5 million).
But the differences between what some think the program should be, and what it actually is, has led to a lack of alignment and a regular churn of changes.
When I wrote about Nebraska’s rocky first decade in the Big Ten in 2021, one person very familiar with the program told me: “Where do you fit with Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, Northwestern or Purdue? They didn’t want to judge themselves against that group. They wanted to judge themselves against Michigan, Ohio State, Penn State. The sky’s falling when you lose to Purdue. They have to get self-awareness as to who they are, where they fit.”
As former Huskers I-back Damon Benning added, “Nebraska’s still held captive by the success they’ve had. They need to be comfortable in their own skin.”
Self-awareness has hurt Nebraska, but it’s not the only problem. Pelini’s teams actually delivered what Nebraska should realistically expect, ideally with more Big Ten championship game appearances. But Pelini clashed with then-AD Shawn Eichorst and others, leading to their divorce.
Frost was supposed to bridge Nebraska’s storied history with modern ideas in scheme, recruiting and other areas. But Frost’s teams never reflected the qualities of those he played on nor the traits needed to succeed in the Big Ten. Playing in a division where talent differences are minimal and margins of games are thin, Nebraska almost always ended up on the wrong end.
Biggest lesson for the future: The most infuriating part about Nebraska’s odyssey is that so many of the traits baked into the Devaney and Osborne teams — player development, disciplined play, relentless rushing offense and winning the line of scrimmage — are exactly what works in the Big Ten. The Big Red teams of Devaney and Osborne would undoubtedly compete for, at minimum, West Division titles.
But Nebraska rarely reflected those qualities under Frost, who never won more than three Big Ten games in a season.
“I’d just love to … have a team that represents the values of Nebraskans — be tough, win the line of scrimmage, do the fundamental things teams need to do to win games,” Alberts said Sunday.
Osborne recently told me that Nebraska “was able to stay ahead of the curve” for decades, whether it was strength training or academic counseling or its walk-on program.
“We had a lot of players from Nebraska that were not what you’d call blue-chip or four-star or five-star recruits, but they had a strong desire to work hard,” Osborne said. “A lot of places would not be bothered with walk-ons, but we tried to make them special and treat them that way. That was something that worked out well for us.”
Nebraska will have a harder time identifying and exploiting advantages these days, but finding a coach who can recapture the values that worked for decades and apply them to the Big Ten should give the program a boost. Frost often talked about these traits, but his teams rarely reflected them. Perhaps his time away from Lincoln, in more freewheeling programs such as Oregon and UCF, changed his philosophy to a point where it couldn’t work in a generally conservative, don’t-beat-yourself type of conference.
Alberts should be looking for a coach who knows about Nebraska, what worked in the program and can still apply, and what worked and no longer applies. Knowledge of the Big Ten and the region, from recruiting to style of play, also should be a priority. There’s a modern model for winning at Nebraska, which might not result in national championships but certainly will make Huskers fans happier than they are right now.
The time has come for the Huskers to accept and embrace that model, to finally be comfortable in their own skin.
Miami
Glory days: Miami put together one of the most dominant two-decade stretches in college football history, winning five national championships from 1983 to 2001. The Hurricanes finished outside the AP top three just twice from 1983 and 1992, recording seven consecutive top-three finishes at the end of the stretch. The team had four straight AP top-five finishes from 2000 to 2003, winning a national title in 2001 and nearly another in 2002. An FBS independent until 1991, Miami dominated the Big East, winning or sharing the league title nine times in its 13 years as a member.
What happened next: After joining the ACC in 2004, Miami steadily declined. A team that won 10 games or more 14 times from 1983 and 2003 has reached the mark just once, in 2017, since entering the league. In 2007, Miami endured its first losing regular season since 1979. The Nevin Shapiro scandal broke in 2011, and Miami self-imposed a postseason ban in 2012, when the team finished 7-5. The team had just one AP Top 25 finish from 2006 and 2015. Other than Mark Richt, who won 19 games in his first two seasons, no Miami coach generated significant momentum.
What held back the program: Miami became an overnight success in college football, largely on the power of personality — coaches Howard Schnellenberger and Jimmy Johnson had plenty — and an incredible local recruiting effort. No program in the 1980s capitalized on its location like the U, which employed a talented group of recruiters to land many of the top players from the city, county, state and region.
Miami would eventually build a national brand that would attract players from around the country, such as quarterback Ken Dorsey (California) and tight end Jeremy Shockey (Oklahoma).
“There were a lot of good players around Miami, and for whatever reason, particularly in South Florida, there maybe weren’t a lot of teams going down there to recruit,” Osborne said. “They capitalized on those players. Occasionally, they had a good player from somewhere else, but they really did a great job with South Florida.”
Eventually, the South Florida recruiting scene became much more crowded. Miami also fell significantly behind on program investments, relative to its national competitors. Despite the program’s incredible success and what it did for the university’s profile, Miami’s administration was reluctant to go all-in on the areas needed to continue competing for championships.
As colleague Andrea Adelson detailed in May, Miami was the last Power 5 program in the state to build an indoor practice facility, which Richt helped push by contributing $1 million of his own money.
“When everything was even, Miami was dominating the college football world,” Cristobal said. “Then other places started investing a lot, and Miami had fallen way behind. So that’s where there became a gap.”
After firing coach Larry Coker in 2006, Miami hired three coaches with direct connections to the program — Randy Shannon, Manny Diaz and Richt — and one outsider in Al Golden. Richt, a former Miami quarterback, was the only coach with significant experience leading a Power 5 program but also was a good bit removed from his best stretch at Georgia (five AP top-10 finishes from 2002 and 2007) when he took over Miami in 2016.
Although Richt was seen as a significant hire at the time, Miami had not gone all-in after an ascending coach — especially with promises of necessary investments in the program — until its pursuit of Cristobal.
Biggest lesson for the future: The combination of Cristobal and an administration willing to spend has Miami set up to return to championship contention soon. Miami just has to make sure that the totality of Cristobal’s strengths and experiences clicks to elevate the program in the current environment.
Cristobal is a Miami native who played offensive line for the Hurricanes and spent three seasons as an assistant there before landing his first head-coaching job at nearby Florida International in 2007. Following a surprising dismissal at FIU after the 2012 season, Cristobal spent four seasons under Nick Saban at Alabama before going to Oregon, where he became head coach in 2018 following Willie Taggart’s departure to Florida State.
Cristobal dramatically improved Oregon’s recruiting and helped the Ducks to consecutive Pac-12 titles in 2019 and 2020, a Rose Bowl championship and an AP No. 5 finish in 2019, and Pac-12 North Division titles in each of his final three seasons. His impact on Oregon’s recruiting changed the way the program viewed itself, and “certainly informed us as we went into the next search,” Oregon athletic director Rob Mullens told me.
Ideally, Miami gets a Cristobal who recruits relentlessly, develops elite offensive lines and capitalizes on the school’s advantages with name, image and likeness (NIL) and other areas, all while continuing to push the need for investment. Frost’s time away from Nebraska ultimately worked against the program when he returned to Lincoln. Cristobal’s experience away from Miami ultimately must benefit the program and its operation.
Miami’s offensive trajectory will be interesting to watch. There was a belief among coaches that Cristobal didn’t fully maximize former Oregon quarterback Justin Herbert, who has gone on to immediate NFL success. Oregon’s offenses had solid efficiency numbers the past two seasons but ranked 39th nationally in scoring. Cristobal inherited an excellent quarterback at Miami in Tyler Van Dyke and made a strong offensive coordinator hire in Michigan’s Josh Gattis. But the team’s evolution on offense will be worth monitoring.
It’s hard to envision Miami and Cristobal going the way of Nebraska and Frost. Miami is in a much better recruiting location, and Cristobal’s commitment to recruiting sets him apart from many head coaches. His recognition of what worked in the past at Miami, and the areas that must improve, indicate big things are ahead. But Frost’s story also shows nothing is guaranteed in college football.
Florida State
Glory days: Florida State’s stretch of elite success from 1987 to 2000 under coach Bobby Bowden will be difficult for any program — aside from Saban’s Alabama — to ever replicate. The Seminoles finished in the AP top four every year from 1987 to 1999, before tumbling all the way to No. 5 in 2000. They won two national titles (1993 and 1999) and dominated the ACC after joining the league in 1992. The Seminoles won or shared ACC titles in each of their first nine years in the conference, and they would then win three in four seasons from 2002 and 2005. FSU would have another strong stretch from 2012 to 2015, which included the 2013 national title and four AP top-10 finishes.
What happened next: Bowden continued to record Top 25 finishes after 2000, but the Seminoles won only seven games in three of his final four seasons before retirement. The transition from Bowden to Jimbo Fisher went well, as the team won 10 games or more in six of the first seven seasons. But things fell off sharply during Fisher’s final season and continued under Taggart, who went 5-7 in 2018 as Florida State missed a bowl game for the first time since 1981. Since 2017, Florida State is 28-33.
What held back the program: Similar to Miami, Florida State won big by capitalizing on its location for recruiting as well as an iconic coach in Bowden, who led the program from 1976 until 2009. Also like Miami, FSU didn’t always commit the financial resources needed to ensure the program would stay at an elite level. Fisher was acutely aware of the financial issues and ultimately left for a program (Texas A&M) that would spare no expense, despite an on-field profile that didn’t come close to FSU’s. Fisher recruited well, but Florida State didn’t translate the talent to the field and certain positions, such as offensive line and wide receiver, fell off sharply.
Taggart’s tenure began on a terrible note and never recovered, forcing a change after just two seasons. Current Seminoles coach Mike Norvell faced unique challenges with the COVID-19 pandemic during his first year in Tallahassee and also struggled at the start of his first two seasons. Florida State’s recruiting classes have remained in the national Top 25 but are closer to the bottom than the top.
Biggest lesson for the future: Florida State needs the infrastructure to support its program and prevent the type of fast decline that occurred after the 2016 season. Norvell is just 10-13 with the Seminoles but has built good connections both within and around the program. FSU’s hire of athletic director Michael Alford, a gifted fundraiser who had led the Seminole Boosters organization before his appointment, should help stabilize the program’s financial position as much as possible.
The big thing for FSU is not taking anything for granted. Bowden did an incredible job of mining the state’s talent and building a national power at a time when the resource race wasn’t as significant and fewer programs went all-in on Florida recruiting. Florida State faces a steeper climb now, but with the right people and plans in place, it should get back to a competitive position in the ACC.
Tennessee
Glory days: Tennessee has had three periods of high-level success, most recently from 1985 to 2001, when it recorded nine AP top-10 finishes with a national title in 1998 and five SEC championships (outright or shared). The Volunteers never finished outside the AP top nine from 1995 to 1999 and finished No. 4 in 2001. They also had five AP top-10 finishes from 1965 and 1972 and had eight AP top-eight finishes from 1938 to 1956 with a national title in 1951.
What happened next: A year after Tennessee finished No. 12 in 2007, coach Phillip Fulmer recorded his second losing record in four seasons and was fired. Lane Kiffin spent only one season as Vols coach before departing for Southern California, and Tennessee has since recorded only two AP Top 25 finishes (2015 and 2016 under Butch Jones) and zero 10-win seasons. The Vols had only two losing regular seasons from 1981 and 2007, but they have since had seven.
What held back the program: Leadership instability. From 1977 until 2008, Tennessee had two coaches: Fulmer and Johnny Majors. The program had three athletic directors from 1963 and 2010. Since Fulmer’s departure, Tennessee has had five coaches and four ADs. There have been bad coaching hires and moments of peak dysfunction, most notably the search to replace Jones that briefly resulted in Greg Schiano’s hiring and ultimately led to athletic director John Currie’s ouster and the hiring of coach Jeremy Pruitt, whose otherwise forgettable tenure led to 18 alleged NCAA violations.
Biggest lesson for the future: Tennessee has to lean into its advantages with the right type of guardrails, especially from a leadership standpoint. The Vols’ fan base is massive, passionate and extremely engaged. While other groups would have tuned out during the past 15 years, Tennessee fans are as invested as ever, sometimes too much.
“Football and the Power T matters to them a great deal,” current Vols coach Josh Heupel told me this summer. “It is truly embedded in who they are and how they live their lives, in some ways. That has a great effect on the energy we feel. That changes the focus and how intentional we are and the way we work. It has a huge impact on recruiting too.”
The combination of Heupel and athletic director Danny White, who worked together at UCF, gives Tennessee a chance to establish a more stable foundation and identity for the program. Tennessee has been aggressive in the NIL space and the opportunities Knoxville — “A college city,” Heupel said — can provide athletes. But Tennessee’s trajectory won’t truly change until the people at the top stop changing.
Virginia Tech
Glory days: After going 2-8-1 in 1992, Virginia Tech began an incredible run under Hall of Fame coach Frank Beamer. The Hokies finished No. 22 in 1993 then had 13 AP top-20 finishes from 1995 and 2010. Virginia Tech made the national championship game in the 1999 season and had three AP top-10 finishes in four seasons from 2004 and 2007. The team won or shared seven league titles (Big East or ACC) from 1995 to 2007 and had eight consecutive 10-win seasons from 2004 to 2011.
What happened next: After back-to-back 11-3 seasons in 2010 and 2011, Virginia Tech slipped to 7-6 in 2012 and remained at that level for the final three years of Beamer’s tenure. The school replaced him with Memphis’ Justin Fuente, who reached the ACC championship game in his first season and recorded consecutive AP Top 25 finishes. But after 19 wins in the first two seasons, Fuente went 24-23 during the next four years before being fired. Virginia Tech has held an AP ranking in nine of the past 10 seasons but only finished in the polls twice.
What held back the program: Beamer’s success from the mid-1990s through the first decade of the 2000s was probably unsustainable. There was hope Fuente could maintain the trajectory, as his hiring drew excellent reviews. But he had never worked in the region, lacked important recruiting connections and clashed with some key constituents around the program. After winning early mostly with Beamer’s players, Fuente couldn’t build or sustain a roster that competed well enough in the ACC. There was constant roster instability in recent seasons, and Virginia Tech drifted away from its trademark advantages in areas such as defense and special teams.
Biggest lesson for the future: Expecting the same level of success likely isn’t realistic, but Virginia Tech must recapture the approach and style that made Beamer’s teams so special. Beamer built a strong program culture and capitalized on the Tidewater region of the state to land Michael Vick, Kam Chancellor, DeAngelo Hall and other Hokies stars. The hiring of coach Brent Pry, who cut his teeth under longtime Virginia Tech defensive coordinator Bud Foster in the mid-1990s, is a return toward Beamer Ball and the program’s roots. Pry connects well with those around the program and understands the ingredients Virginia Tech needs to compete. He just needs time to upgrade the personnel.
“The Virginia Tech situation’s a little bit worse than what people thought, just from what was left there,” an FBS coach told me. “They’re a little worse off from a roster perspective.”
Virginia Tech has some distinct advantages as a football school in the ACC with a devoted fan base. Recent facilities upgrades will help. But it’s clear after Fuente that Virginia Tech must try to win with a homegrown approach.
Colorado
Glory days: After seven mostly unremarkable seasons, coach Bill McCartney propelled Colorado into the national spotlight. In 1989, the program went 11-1 and finished No. 4; the following year, Colorado replicated its record to win a national title. The Buffaloes recorded eight consecutive AP top-20 finishes from 1989 and 1996 and reached the top eight five times. The team won or shared three consecutive Big Eight titles from 1989 to 1991. Colorado had a No. 9 finish in 2001 and a nice run in the 1970s, including a No. 3 finish in 1971. But nothing came close to what McCartney put together before his retirement at age 54.
What came next: Colorado had some success after McCartney, as Rick Neuheisel won 10 games in each of his first two seasons and Gary Barnett’s teams consistently competed for the Big 12 North Division title. But declining results and off-field issues led to Barnett’s departure in 2005, and Colorado has since recorded only two winning seasons and three bowl appearances. The Buffs have had only one AP Top 25 finish since 2002, and that was in 2016, which also marked the team’s only season with more than six wins since 2005.
What held back the program: A mix of instability, unsuccessful coaching hires and financial issues. Colorado has struggled to keep pace financially over the years, although facilities upgrades beginning in 2013 have helped ease the challenge. The team also hasn’t found a coach who has generated any consistency. Dan Hawkins arrived from Boise State with great credentials but never won more than six games. Jon Embree lasted only two years and won four games before being ousted. Mike MacIntyre couldn’t build on a 10-win season in 2016, and Mel Tucker bolted for Michigan State after only one year in Boulder. Current Buffs coach Karl Dorrell is 4-10 since a promising debut in 2020, and he has an offense ranked 126th nationally in scoring. Before Hawkins, five of the previous six Colorado coaches generated some level of success. The resource issues can’t be ignored, but Colorado also hasn’t gotten it done on the field.
Biggest lesson for the future: Dorrell’s future is in doubt because of Colorado’s poor start and an unrelenting schedule. The program ultimately has to find an edge and a clear identity. McCartney focused on recruiting California during his tenure and brought in Eric Bieniemy, Darian Hagan, Sal Aunese and other stars for his best teams. Whether it’s California, Texas or another fertile region, Colorado needs to find a recruiting niche again. The tricky part is that while another leadership transition might be needed, the program also needs stability after going through significant roster turnover in 2021 and 2022.
Colorado has several advantages, such as its campus, beautiful stadium, football tradition and solid fan base. But until the program stabilizes with the right person at the top, it likely will continue to sputter.
